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VICTORIA GALLEGOS: The Impact of Civil Society Engagement (Under the direction of 
Gregory Love).  
 
 
This thesis asks the impact of someone’s civic engagement and civil society organization 
involvement on support for the 2016 Colombian peace agreement. Additionally, discussed is the 
impact of conflict exposure on engagement and involvement. Through an analysis of several 
variables taken from Vanderbilt University’s LAPOP data set, there is a positive association 
between conflict exposure and one’s civic engagement and civil society involvement. Civil 

























I became first seriously interested in the Colombian peace process and peace negotiations 
after studying abroad in Bogota, Colombia and witnessing first-hand a nation still recovering 
from, and reckoning with its recent conflict. My days at school were frequented with discussions 
and debates about the FARC, paramilitary groups, and the Colombian government, and my 
classmates passionately argued over the peace agreement (its successes and failures) many times 
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Introduction  
Are people who are more disengaged from civil society more likely to be critical of the 
government and attempts for peace negotiations? Or is it those who are most engaged who are 
more critical of the government? The understanding of these questions can be very valuable in 
real-life situations and provide important information to policymakers and peacemakers; 
understanding areas of support or lack thereof for peacemakers can help shape media campaigns, 
create areas for discussion, and more. In the context of Colombia, a nation that only recently 
formally ended its civil war, knowing factors which may [or may not] contribute to a citizen’s 
likelihood of supporting peace can be beneficial to those that negotiate peace. The answers to 
these questions can have real world applications on peace negotiations, and therefore are 
important to study.  
Civic engagement and engagement with society are just two variables of many which should 
be analyzed with respect to support/nonsupport of peace negotiations. However, these two are 
especially important given the role of civil society in peace negotiations. As will be discussed 
further, the role of civil society is to be representative of the interests and needs of the public; 
thus, in peace negotiations, civil society organizations can and do serve as the voice of the people 
and vote or negotiate on behalf of the people whom they represent.  
Since 1945, civil conflict has impacted more than half of the world’s nations, with more than 
a fifth experiencing 10 or more years of war (Blattman and Miguel). Several of these afflicted 
nations likely engaged in peace negotiations at some point.  
In Colombia, civil society has played an important role in both sides of the conflict, and 
various civil society organizations (CSOs) were often--and still are--violently targeted by the 
state, paramilitaries, and guerilla groups like FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
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Colombia) and ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional)1. Because of civil society’s large role in 
the conflict, and its integral place in Colombian and Latin American life, studying the connection 
between a person’s involvement in his society and his support for peace can have important 
implications.  
In addition to examining the relationship between civil society engagement and support for 
the peace negotiations, a person’s individual civic engagement will also be looked at. Table 1 
will summarize the differences between civic engagement and civil society participation. This 
latter data will provide some insight into the individual-level of interaction with government and 
politics a person has.  
It is always important to understand the public’s opinion in a peace negotiation since 
logically peace should be sought in a society and benefit the greater good, and evermore so in the 
Colombian context, when the Colombian public shocked the world and voted to reject the peace 
accord in a nation-wide referendum in 2016. Although the vote was close, it signaled the public 
was unsure about the best ways to achieve peace, with many believing there would be no 
retribution for the atrocities committed by FARC rebels. Despite this public signal, the 
Colombian Congress approved a revised peace agreement in December 2016, never putting it to 
another national referendum, and President Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) was awarded a 
Nobel Peace Prize. This peace agreement, brokered between Santos and leaders of the FARC, 
known as the Acuerdo de Paz, is the specific negotiation studied in this paper.  
 
1 Almost ironically, both the FARC and ELN formed because of exclusion from a power-sharing 
agreement in the aftermath of La Violencia. Certain groups of society (students, Catholic radicals, left-wing 
intellectuals, militant communists and peasant self-defense groups to name some) (Felter and Renwick 2017) 
believed they had been ignored by the Colombian government and took up arms in response. These two groups 
contributed to the terrible violence which left 220,000 dead, 25,000 disappeared, and 5.7 million displaced.  
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In the immediate aftermath of the 2016 peace accord between the Colombian Government 
and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), short-term commitments were 
honored and implemented. These included the stipulations such as the definitive cease-fire, 
laying down of arms, and the creation of a framework for institutional peacebuilding (Kroc 
2019). As of 2020, the peace accord is transitioning into its second phase involving greater 
medium to long-term commitments, including but not limited to: “reducing socioeconomic gaps 
between rural and urban areas, ensuring the long-term reincorporation of ex-combatants, 
guaranteeing the rights of victims, and advancing cross-cutting measures regarding ethnicity and 
gender.” (Kroc 2019). Despite progress being made (such as the immediate cease-fire and laying 
down of weapons), and the peace accord continuing to be upheld, albeit to a degree, there has 
been disparity in the implementation of security and protection accord mechanisms; “violent 
attacks on community leaders, human rights defenders, and peace activists have soared,” 
(Matallana 2018). The power gap left by the FARC demobilization allowed new cycles of 
violence to occur, with the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) guerilla group occupying the 
space, in addition to other non-state armed actors. There are several challenges to implement 
peace on the ground, and “as such, human rights defenders, grassroots organizations, civil 
society networks, and other peace building initiatives continue to endure,” thereby facing 
pressure from armed actors at the local level (Matallana 2018).  
In 2019, former FARC commander Ivan Marquez called for the guerilla group to rearm, 
stating that “the state has not fulfilled its most important obligation, which is to guarantee the life 
of its citizens and especially avoid assassinations for political reasons.” In the background of the 
speech, stood more than 20 armed fighters in front of a sign which read “As long as there is a 
will to fight there will be hope for victory.” (Ingber 2019). Some believed the reaction was due 
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to “the lack of political will to implement all aspects of the peace accord and a troubling violence 
over the last year...that has undermined the transformative promises of the accord…” (WOLA, 
2019), but there are several possible motives which likely played into the call to rearm, such as 
the Santrich Affair (State 2020). As evidenced, the peace accord does have several issues, and 
the current Duque administration, the Colombian public, and current & former FARC rebels all 
have competing interests.  
With the demobilization of FARC, ELN remains the largest active terrorist organization in 
Colombia.  Peace talks with ELN were held in Havana during 2018 but have been slow to 
progress. Part of this can be attributed to the decentralization of the organization (in comparison 
to the hierarchical structure of the FARC), and to the political differences between the Duque 
and Santos administrations.  Currently, the peace talks between ELN and Colombia are at a 
standstill, formally suspended by President Duque after a bombing attack in Bogota in January 
2019.  
Soon Colombia will be heading into a presidential election, and early polling has already 
shown that the public will likely favor candidates who support the implementation of the peace 
agreement, and future agreements (Alsema 2020). The question remains, who are the people who 
support the peace agreement and want to see it fully implemented? What factors may contribute 
to a person’s support or nonsupport of the peace agreement? These questions and their answers 
are important, especially for a presidential candidate trying to garner support or tap into potential 




This literature review will look to two general questions. First, what predicts someone’s 
participation in civil society? Second, how does someone’s participation in civil society affect 
his/her support for the peace process? 
In the aftermath of the unexpected referendum failure to confirm the peace accord in 
2016--with 50.2% of the public voting against it--numerous studies and academic papers were 
written in an attempt to explain the surprising results. Many of these papers seek to understand 
and explain public support for the peace process, measured by a few specific variables and their 
direct relationship to peace perception. This thesis is no different in that respect, as it too will 
primarily focus on the impact of civil society participation and civic engagement on support for 
the Colombian peace accord. A comprehensive review of the relevant literature will focus on 
four points: i) defining civil society and civic engagement ii) the relationship between 
conflict experiences and civil society participation, iii) conflict experiences and support for 
the peace process iv) the factors which make someone more likely to participate in both, 
and v) the effect of general civil society engagement on supporting peace.  
 
Defining Civil Society and Civic Engagement 
The concepts of civil society and civic engagement have been studied separately and together, 
however this thesis will treat the two as separate concepts--albeit intertwined--since they both 
potentially matter differently in support of the peace agreement.  
When describing civil society, Barnes (2009) writes “[t]his self-mobilization often occurs 
through the existing forms of social organization, ranging from faith-based institutions and 
traditional/customary structures to modern NGOs, women’s organization and academic 
networks.” This is a grand definition but captures the variety of organizations that all qualify 
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under the umbrella of civil society. Similarly, Wanis-St. John and Kew (2008) point out the lack 
of uniformity among civil society, stating “it [civil society] comes in many organizational forms, 
it can have varying degrees of autonomy from the state, and comes it can even serve as a 
substitute for the state when government’s fail to serve their population.” However, Wanis-St. 
John and Kew go further, defining the supposed opposite of civil society, that is, “uncivil 
society”: “civil society can also decay into ‘uncivil’ society, political militancy, and can even 
blend into insurgency, especially in conflicts where little or no attention is paid to gaining 
popular support for peace.” This is an important distinction, defining which social organizations 
are included in the term “civil society.” To be considered a civil society group it must be civic-
minded, “in that their purpose is to promote the interest and perspectives of a particular sector of 
society, but not all issues for all sectors” (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008). Especially in the 
context of Colombia, there are plenty of social organizations which may have begun as CSOs but 
traversed into the “uncivil” realm. To generally qualify a group as civil or uncivil, one should 
consider whether the group uses violence or destructive methods; although the boundaries of 
civil society are murky, civil society groups use pacific means rather than military ones to 
promote and achieve their goals (Barnes 2009). 
Political parties differ from civil society groups, in that while CSOs may promote one 
issue, or possible a range of issues for a sector of the population, “they do not seek to articulate 
the universal range of issues or appeal to the scope of population that political parties do, nor 
does civil society seek to capture the state like political parties” (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008).  
Principally, civil society organizations (CSO) are local efforts often located within a greater 
network of likeminded groups, and they may receive inspiration or donations from outside 
groups, such as non-governmental organizations. 
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It is important to note that civil society organizations are not, inherently peacebuilding 
organizations. Peacebuilding civil society organizations do exist and are plentiful throughout 
Colombia both historically and in contemporary terms (Matallana 2018), but the majority of 
CSOs are not formed with the purpose of peacebuilding. When using the term “civil society 
organization,” this thesis shall refer to the entirety of CSOs, regardless of a peacebuilding goal. 
In a theoretical sense, civil society can be envisioned as the web of organizations 
operating in the political space between the state and individual citizens (Wanis-St. John and 
Kew 2008), whether they be community organizations, religious institutions, business, 
professional, etc. A three-part model suggested by Arato and Cohen (1992) explains civil society 
as the social interaction in-between two separate economic and state spheres.  
Civil society is a collective engagement with an issue or issues, while civic engagement 
is an individual-level engagement with issues. One does often lead to the other; civil society 
engagement and social participation, such as volunteering, often leads to political participation 
(Gauthier 2003). Given this related nature, what is civic engagement, and how is it similar or 
different from civil society engagement?  
Unfortunately, academic definitions do overlap these two concepts. For example, 
Checkoway & Aldana (2013), define civic engagement as “a process in which people take 
collective action to address issues of public concern.” Cicognani et. al (2012) also lists examples 
of civic engagement, looping together political participation, in the forms of boycotts, strikes, or 
by signing petitions, and non-political ways such as volunteering, community service, sports 
clubs and cultural associations. Some of these activities coincide with civil society organizations, 
such as sports clubs and cultural associations, while some are more individual level based such 
as the decision to boycott or sign a petition. Seemingly, civic engagement and civil society 
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engagement do overlap when it comes to collective actions, but civic engagement alone includes 
individual-level actions. Because of the considerable overlap, the majority of analysis will focus 
specifically on the relationship between civil society organization involvement.  
For the purposes of this thesis, the term civil society will reference collective-level 
engagement, while civic engagement will reference individual-level engagement. To examine the 
relationship between both concepts and support for the Colombian peace accord, group and 
individual level variables will be analyzed accordingly. This thesis will consider and measure 
civic engagement and civil society participation by the breakdown of the table below. 
Civic Engagement (Individual-level) Civil Society Participation (Collective-level) 
• Participation in a protest 
• Voting in local or national elections 
• Attending a religious organization 
• Attending a parent association  
Table 1: Examples of how civic engagement and civil society participation can be measured 
 
Conflict Exposure on Civil Society Participation  
An important variable to study in the greater context of the Colombian conflict is the impact of 
conflict experiences on participation in civil society. This variable is of particular interest 
because of the theory that those who experience and live through conflict are more likely to 
engage in civil society and that ultimately helps shape support for the peace process. However, 
the violence and destruction caused during the Colombian conflict was not spread equally 
throughout the country, and certain groups and regions experienced the effects of the conflict far 
more than others. This difference will be accounted for in the quantitative analysis.  
 It is important to distinguish between conflict exposure and a similar variable, 
victimization. By using the term conflict exposure, this will mean someone’s personal experience 
witnessing, or living through the armed conflict. This can be measured by participation in the 
conflict, losing a family member to the conflict, or becoming displaced due to the conflict. 
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Victimization shall be taken as a person’s individual experience with victimhood, such as being 
the victim of a crime or personal loss.    
Experience with violence will lead to higher engagement in social and political activities, 
according to numerous academic studies on both real-world situations and controlled 
experiments. In a comprehensive multi-nation analysis, the paper “Can War Foster Cooperation,” 
(2016) analyzed 23 post-conflict papers about global conflicts, including Sierra Leone, Uganda, 
Nepal, Israel, and Tajikistan, to name a few. In its analysis, the authors found that across all case 
studies, people exposed to war violence (real or experimental) tend to exhibit more “prosocial 
behavior,” which can be evidenced by participation in local social and civic groups, or by taking 
community leadership roles. Bauer et. al also found no evidence that the effects of war violence 
on prosocial behavior decline over time.  
In a case study of the conflict in Sierra Leone, researchers tested for very specific 
variables, finding that people in households which had directly experienced war violence [when 
compared to people in households that had not] were 6.5% more likely to attend a community 
meeting, 2.6% more likely to vote in elections, and were more like to join in social and political 
groups, as well as participate in school committees (Bellows and Miguel 2009).  
In another experiment with allocation games, Bauer et. al 2014 found that when 
compared to “nonvictims,” people who were directly exposed to conflict-related violence were 
less selfish by 23 percentage point, and more inequality averse by 25 percentage points. In a 
natural experiment in Darfur, researchers found that on a micro-level conflict experiences and 
exposure to violence did correlate with more pro-peace attitudes and lower want to execute 
enemies. Conflict experiences bring both resilience and war-weariness, both of which are 
channeled into pro-social behavior and a want for peace (Hazlett 2019).  
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Branton et. al focused specifically on these variables in the context of Colombia and 
found that violence positively affected an individuals’ level of civic and political engagement in 
society, meaning that people exposed to violence are more likely to become cooperative, 
participate in social activities, and take leadership roles in the community. By this logic, the 
authors argued that individuals living in conflict-affected areas would more likely develop pro-
social attitudes and have a greater level of personal investment in the community.  
All of these studies, whether they be on real post-conflict situations or experimental 
allocation games, confirmed that those who are exposed to real or experimental conflict 
demonstrated more “prosocial” behavior, which was seen through an increase in likelihood to 
engage with civil society organizations, such as community meetings (Bellows and Miguel 2009) 
and local social or civic groups (Bauer et. al 2016). Prosocial behavior also included individual-
level civic engagement, such as increased likelihood of voting in elections.  
These findings are all confirmed and further explored by Christopher Blattman (2009), in 
his natural study of post-violent conflict in northern Uganda. There, he studied survey data and 
qualitative interviews with ex-combatants of the conflict to understand the social and political 
participation of abducted and non-abducted Ugandan youth. Blattman found that forced 
recruitment resulted in a 27% increase in the likelihood of voting, and a 100% increase in the 
likelihood of becoming a community leader among other abductees.  
Blattman measured political participation through survey questions which included 
questions about voting in the most recent referendum, being a community mobilizer (elected 
member of the community), and holding a political job (e.g. elected local councilperson). To 
measure community participation, the survey asked questions about membership in a community 
group, such as a peace group, water management committee, cultural groups, sports clubs, school 
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clubs, religious groups, and more. His results find that “[a]bductees who witnessed the most 
counts of violence are the most likely to participate politically later in life. Each additional act of 
violence witnessed is associated with a 4.2 percentage point increase in the probability of voting 
and a 2.3 percentage point increase in the probability of being a community mobilizer.” Blattman 
also found a significant relationship between witnessed violence and community group 
membership (each act of violence witnessed was associated with a 5.2 percentage point increase 
in group membership).   
The theory he presents is that witnessed violence leads to positive political engagement 
because of three possible reasons: first, the aftermath of a traumatic experience can result in 
“post-traumatic growth,” second, individuals who experienced violence value the act of political 
expression, and third traumatic experiences provide real information and experience which help 
shape perspective of conflict and the need of collective action.  
Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, I can expect to see that experience with conflict will 
likely be positively associated with both engagement in civil society organizations and positively 
associated with individual-level civic engagement.  
 
Conflict Exposure and Support for Peace Processes 
Specific to conflict exposure and support for peace processes, there are two important 
gaps in the literature on the question of how conflict exposure impacts support for peace. First, 
there is a lack of consensus on “how conflict exposure might shape preferences for specific 
conflict-termination policies and outcomes in societies undergoing peace processes,” (Tellez 
2019). The key word being “specific” since there is plenty of research on general attitudes about 
peace processes. Second, “there has been little systemic analysis of the specific role of civic 
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engagement and civil society in the context of armed conflict, and even less regarding its 
potentials, limitations, and critical factors” (Paffenholz and Spurk 2016). The latter gap is more 
of an issue, since this paper will focus on the specific roles of civic engagement and civil society, 
in the context of the Colombian conflict.   
There is some research on this relationship, such as Branton et. al (2019), who found that 
support for the 2016 Colombian peace referendum increased as violence exposure increased and 
that support the peace agreement was higher among those who had exposure to the violence, 
when compared to individuals living in areas less affected by the Colombian conflict. In their 
recent article, Montoya and Tellez (2020) analyzed civilian preferences in Colombian peace 
negotiations, including variables made with “data related to victimization, conflict proximity, 
and attitudes towards the warring actors” (p. 260) The authors constructed an indicator used to 
designate different locations as “conflict zones,” and additionally looked at variables which 
measured different levels of personal or indirect conflict-related violence. The results of 
Montoya and Tellez’s study find a very significant difference between victimization variables 
and conflict proximity. Conflict proximity (i.e., physical proximity to armed combat) was a 
strong predictor of civilian attitudes on peace negotiations (could explain 25% of the attitude), 
whereas “victimization experiences--such as whether the respondent or those close to them were 
harmed, forced to leave, etc. in response to the conflict--seem to offer very little predictive 
power, with none breaking 10 per cent in permutation importance.” (p. 266). 
Both Branton et. al and Montoya and Tellez found a positive relationship between 
support for the peace process and conflict exposure, and Montoya and Tellez also confirmed that 
the variable of victimhood had no effect on likelihood of supporting the peace process. If those 
who experience conflict are more likely to be involved in civil society and more likely to support 
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peace negotiations, then what are the opinions of other sectors of civil society on support for 
peace? 
 
Participation in Civil Society & Civic Engagement 
What type of people or specific factors make someone more inclined to engage in civil society or 
become a member of a civil society organization? Similar questions worth considering are the 
restrictions and barriers some may face to joining civil society organizations.   
 Naturally, people come together with shared interests, but civil society organizations 
offer formal and informal methods, which cannot be replicated by government or business, for 
people to express their concerns, interests, and wants (Radon and Pecharroman 2017). Three 
possible roles of civil society include “addressing a citizen’s day-to-day need; second, by 
providing feedback to public authorities and thereby informing government decision makers; and 
third, by ensuring respect and promotion of the rights of a nation’s citizens” (Radon and 
Pecharroman 2017 p. 33). Not all civil society organizations must have a larger, serious, political 
goal in mind. As defined earlier, the CSOs come in many sizes with a variety of objectives and 
purposes. Nevertheless, if civil society is a way for a nation’s citizens to contribute to public 
discourse and democracy, and shape a community, then the people who are involved in it are 
those who have interest in bettering their situation. Technology and increased globalization have 
created “millions of civil society organizations around the world, giving rise to exciting models 
for citizen expression both online and offline, and generating increasing involvement in global 
government processes” (World Economic Forum 2013).   
There are real limitations on the operations of civil society, worth mentioning. According 
to CIVICUS, an international non-profit dedicated to strengthening civil society, only four 
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percent of the world’s population live in countries that have open civic space (defined as the 
space needed for civil society to function freely). “Restrictions on civic space disproportionately 
affect already vulnerable and excluded groups, such as migrants and refugees, women, 
indigenous people and LGBTQI people, among others” (CIVICUS 2019). These restrictions to 
civil society organizations are suppressed by states and non-state actors, such a paramilitary or 
vigilante groups. Restrictions, such as controlling web content and free speech restrictions, are 
increasingly occurring in countries governed by autocratic regimes but sometimes democracies 
swell and can be explained by “governments feeling threatened by civil society; a government’s 
desire for order, and its fear that civil society movements or opposition could take advantage of 
weakness within states.” (Radon and Pecharroman p. 38).  
 
Civil Society Participation and Civic Engagement on Support for Peace  
Civil society can play a significant role in both the development and resolution of a conflict. 
These roles can range, from raising awareness of situations of injustice, to creating conditions 
conducive to peace talks, to setting policy agendas, securing sustainability, and treating conflicts 
constructively (Barnes 2009, Paffenholz 2010). Ongoing conflict makes it difficult for civil 
society to operate (Spurk 2010). During times of war “general security drops, impunity rises and 
respect for basic human rights is challenged, making civil society work more dangerous,” 
(Losnegård 2017).  
The involvement of civil society in peace negotiations or armed conflict does face 
resistance in governments and international organizations; historically speaking, the keeping of 
peace and security was a matter for the states, not substate or local groups. In the twenty-first 
century however, war and conflict has clearly evolved from being solely inter-state, and “the 
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complexity, scale and diversity of violent conflict means that no single entity, on its own, can 
hope to adequately address the challenge of ensuring sustainable peace” (GPPAC 2005). In fact, 
Nilsson’s study (2012) of inclusion of civil society actors show that nearly one third of all peace 
agreements in the post-Cold War period have formally included civil society actors. Other 
research echoes similar sentiments about governments alone lacking the ability to end conflicts 
(Barnes 2009). While modern governments may advocate for citizen and organization 
participation in peace processes, the process and negations themselves are often secretive and 
exclusive, limiting the public’s knowledge (Losnegård 2017). 
Previous studies do indicate that when civil society organizations are included in peace 
negotiations, peace agreements are more sustainable (Nilsson 2012, Wanis St.-John and Kew 
2008), and that the exclusion of non-armed, non-state actors contribute to peace agreements 
failing in implementation phases (Zartman 2008). Part of this failure is because without CSO 
engagement, then people do not have a stake in the agreement (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008). 
Opportunities for civil society organizations to have a place in negotiations is extremely 
important for marginalized groups who may typically lack representation (Barnes 2002), and in 
the case of Colombia, those groups may be disproportionately affected by the conflict.  
As defined above, civil society can take on a variety of forms, and represents diverse 
interests and values. While this diversity of interest can make it difficult to reach a peace 
agreement, research overwhelmingly speaks of its benefits and long-term contributions to 
sustainable peace. Why specifically, might engagement in civil society encourage support or a 
peace process?  
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 Wanis-St. John and Kew argue that civil society groups can be democratic ““safe areas,” 
providing a political space where democratic values are protected and propagated to some 
degree,” (2008).  They further state: 
“The civic values promoted by civil society are important not only for supporting 
democracy, but as the basis of promoting peace-oriented norms across war-torn societies. 
If we compare democratic political-cultural values with the norms underpinning many 
transformative conflict resolution models, we find that they are virtually identical, such 
that efforts to promote one promote the other, providing the basis for the normative 
consensus that healthy politics require that disputes should be settled peacefully.”  
In other words, Wanis-St. John and Kew theorize that civil society inherently promotes 
democratic values, and that democratic values go hand-in hand with promotion of peace.   
Colombia has an active and vibrant civil society striving for peace. Since the conflict 
began several decades ago, community leaders have been targets for both the government and 
guerilla forces. This history is outlined in a report published by Centro de Memoria Histórica 
(2013), which describes the use of massacres by paramilitary groups to dissuade social 
mobilization. Over and over again, violence is used against important local community leaders, 
specifically in rural areas. The victims of the Colombian conflict are mostly civilians, and an 
estimated 82% of the 220,000 people killed between 1958 and 2012 were civilians.  
In the 1970s and 1960s, leading Colombian civil society actors were worker’s unions and 
peasants’ movements (Rojas Rodríguez 2004), in the 1970s indigenous mobilizations took place 
(Benavidas 2009), and later in the decade and early 80s Afro-Colombian peasant associations 
formed (Wouters 2001). By the end of the century, NGOs and civil society peace activism were 
growing as well (Rojas Rodriguez 2004).  
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There were numerous peace attempts to end the conflict in Colombia well-before the 
Santos administration. The first noted attempt was under the administration of President 
Betancur (1982-1986), followed by the Barco administration (1986-1990).  During these years, 
civil society discussed alternatives to violence, and marches and forums took place (Erlingsson 
2013). Yet talks with FARC and ELN failed under the Gaviria administration (1990-1994), and 
the military solution was used. Matallana (2018) follows the development of two major peace 
societies during this time period, Redepaz (Rede Nacional De Iniciativas Ciudadanas por la Paz 
y Contra la Guerra) and Ruta (Ruta Pacifica de las Mujeres), which were given rise after FARC 
and ELN abandoned negotiations in the 90s. Redepaz was successful as a national civic pact of 
peace, and it used bottom-up peacebuilding strategies to “consolidate civic resistance against 
violence and enable people to engage in democracy and participate in politics at the local level” 
(Matallana 2018). Unfortunately, members of the organization were violently attacked in “a 
wave of murders, forced displacements, and kidnappings” in attempts to disrupt its successful 
participatory democratization processes. Ruta members also faced threats and pressure from 
armed actors but remained adherent to their work on local mobilization on anti-violence despite 
the risks. Possibility of assassination is very real for human rights defenders, leaders of civil 
society, and members of victim organizations. Nevertheless, the Redepaz network and Ruta and 
played a significant role in the current peace process with the Santos administration through 
organization of parades, advocating for the negotiations, and served as an alliance between the 
government and civil society (Matallana 2018). These two organizations are among many in 
Colombia which focus on local bottom-up indicatives. Do the plethora of civil society 
organizations hold up to frameworks of peacebuilding?  
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In her work, Erlingsson (2013) tests a seven-part model of peacebuilding against the 
Colombian case. Her model, originally developed by Paffenholz and Spurk (2012) uses 
interviews to argue that Colombian civil society performs all the functions of peacebuilding--
"protection, monitoring, advocacy and public communication, in-group socialization, social 
cohesion, facilitation/meditation and service delivery  
The initial preamble of the cease-fire (General Agreement for an End to the Conflict and 
the Construction of a Stable and Long-Lasting Peace) actually underscored the importance of 
civil society in the conflict’s end, stating that “peacebuilding concerns society as a whole and 
requires participation by all those involved, without distinctions, including other guerilla 
organizations whom we invite to join in this effort” (Zambrano and Isa 2013). The ceasefire 
agreement mentioned civil society at multiple points, and FARC representatives were the most 
supportive of civil society presence at the negotiation table (Zambrano and Isa 2013). There are 
also notable successes in the agreement, stemming from civil society participation which include 
references to rights of LGBTI groups and emphasis on women’s representation (Cóbar et. al 
2018). 
Clearly, civil social organizations clearly played a role in the peace process, but countless 
academic research argues the level of engagement was not enough, and in consequence was one 
of the reasons why the referendum embarrassingly failed.  
There are several explanations pertaining to civil society and the failure of the 2016 
referendum. One explanation argued it was polarization and regional dynamics and distrust 
between civil society and the state which hampered real efforts for peacebuilding (Erlingsson 
2013). Another popular theory argues the peace negotiations were too secretive for too long, and 
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the confidentiality between the Santos government and FARC allowed a public information 
vacuum to be filled with disinformation (Amaral 2019). 
Part of the complexities of the Colombian conflict can be attributed to the number of 
actors involved, which partially explains the difficulty for a negotiation to be reached (González 
2004). The diversity of actors, including the wide range of civil society organizations, reflects 
the diversity of Colombia. Imagined in El Espectador, “It is no use participating in a forum 
composed of 1,200 members, each of whom holds a different opinion regarding rural 
development. That is a Pandora’s box.” (Zambrano and Isa 2013).  
   
 
   
 
Research Design  
The research question then, asks if the people who are disengaged from civil society more likely 
to be critical of the government and attempts for peace negotiations? Or is it those who are most 
engaged who are critical of the government?  
Hypotheses 
Conflict Exposure 
a. Exposure to conflict is positively associated with engagement in civil society 
organizations.  
b. Exposure to conflict is positively associated with personal civic engagement.  
Civic Engagement 
a. Civic engagement is positively associated with attitudes towards the peace process.  
Civil Society Involvement 
a. Civil society involvement is positively associated with attitudes towards the peace 
process.  
Data and Measurement 
The data I use is from Vanderbilt University’s Latin American Public Opinion Project, 
specifically the Americas Barometer 2016/2017 set. This public survey data set was collected 
between August 3, 2016 and October 29, 2016, which is within the time frame of the Colombian 
peace referendum, which occurred on October 2, 2016. LAPOP researchers used a probability 
sample design of voting-adults, conducting a total of 1,563 face-to-face interviews conducted in 
Spanish. The survey was asked across the entire country, and it was stratified across Colombia’s 
six main geographical regions--in this survey data specifically 1,232 respondents were sampled 
from urban areas whereas 331 were from rural areas.  
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After selecting which households, one respondent from each household was chosen based on 
a frequency matching program which considered gender and age, and the permanence of the 
members living in the house (excluded visiting person).  
My analytical approach will be to use a regression analysis to model the causal relationships 
between the independent variables and the dependent variable. A linear regression is used to 
measure the effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable. For all three 
hypotheses I use separate linear regression models. 
The variables “Conflict Exposure,” “Civic Engagement” and “Civil Society Engagement” are 
additive scales. In other words, for each concept multiple questions are relevant, and rather than 
have several independent or dependent variables, the possible scaled scores are all added 
together, comprising a larger scale for measuring one’s exposure to conflict or one’s engagement 
with civil society.  
The variable “Conflict Exposure,” will be measured on a 6-point scale, ranging from 0 (no 
exposure to conflict) to 5 (highest exposure to conflict). The scaled survey questions 
incorporated in the making of this new variable are: 
• “Have you lost a family member or relative to the armed conflict? 
• “Have you had a family member leave the country due to the conflict?” 
• “Was a family member displaced due to the conflict?” 
• “Have you had a family member kidnapped due to the conflict?” 
• “Have you had a family member stripped of land due to the conflict?” 
Each of these questions was responded to with a simple yes or no. In this additive scale, a 
“no” answer will equate to 0, while a “yes” will equal 1.  
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The variable “Civic Engagement” will be measured on a 3-point scale, ranging from 0 (no 
civic engagement) to 2 (high civic engagement). The scaled survey questions incorporated in the 
making of this new variable are: 
• “In the last 12 months, have you participated in a protest?” 
• “Did you vote in the last presidential election in 2014” 
• “Did you vote in the last local elections in October 2015?” 
Each of these questions was responded to with a simple yes or no. In this additive scale, a 
“no” answer will equate to 0, while a “yes” will equal 1.  
The variable “Civil Society Engagement” will be measured on a 21 point scale, ranging 
from 0 (no engagement with civil society) to 20 (maximum engagement with civil society) . The 
scaled survey questions incorporated in the making of this new variable are: 
• “How often do you attend meetings for religious organizations?” 
• “How often do you attend meetings for parent associations?”2 
• “How often do you attend meetings of community involvement groups?” 
• “How often do you attend meetings of political movements or parties?” 
• “How often do you attend meetings of women’s groups?” 
• “How often do you attend meetings of community action boards?” 
• “How often do you attend meetings of groups that promote peace?” 
 
2 Whether or not to incorporate this question was discussed. Initially, there were concerns over how age fit into this 
question, such as someone of old age may not have children in school, or in contrast, someone of young age may not 
be old enough to have children. Technically if someone has no children, they will score a 0 on this variable alone, 
which is not incorrect.  
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Each of these variables separately was initially coded on a scale of 1 = never, 2 = once or 
twice a year, 3 = once or twice a month, and 4 = once a week. However, all were re-coded into a 
scale of 0-3, with 0 meaning never.  
The variable “Support of the peace agreement” is measured on a seven-point scale ranging 
from 1 to 7, intended to measure peoples’ attitudes toward peace. Survey respondents were asked 
this question: 
• “The government of President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC signed a peace 
agreement. To what extent do you support this peace agreement?”” 
Their answers were coded 1-7 based on their response signifying 1 = Not at all; to 7 = A lot.  
 In each separate analysis, the control variables of gender, age, skin color, income, and 
urban/rural will be accounted for.  
Control Variable Survey Measurement Scale 
Gender 1 = Male; 2=Female 
Age  Measured in years of age the respondent is 
Skin tone 1= “Very Light” to 11= “Very Dark” *skin tone is measured by 
placing the respondent’s hand next to a measuring color palate.  
Income Measured on a scale from 0 (no income) to 16 (highest income) 
Urban/Rural 1 = “Urban”, 2= “Rural” 
Table 1: Survey measurement scale for each control variable 
Issue I: Conflict Exposure & Civil Society Engagement 
1) Dependent variable: Civil Society Engagement  
Independent variable: Conflict Exposure 
Control variables: Gender, Age, Skin tone, Income, Urban/Rural 
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2) Dependent variable: Civic Engagement 
Independent variable: Conflict Exposure 
Control variables: Gender, Age, Skin tone, Income, Urban/Rural  
 
Issue II: Civic Engagement & Support for Peace 
Dependent variable: Support for Peace 
Independent variable: Civic Engagement 
Control variables: Gender, Age, Skin tone, Income, Urban/Rural 
 
Issue III: Civil Society Engagement & Support for Peace 
Dependent variable: Support for Peace 
Independent variable: Civil Society Engagement 
Control variables: Gender, Age, Skin tone, Income, Urban/Rural 
Before conducting the regression, I thought useful to see central tendency and degree of variation 
among the dependent variable. Included below is a simple bar chart of the dependent variable, 
Support of the Peace Agreement, depicting the survey respondent’s support for the peace process 
(Fig. 1). As seen in the chart, there is not a significant skew either way, although several 
respondents chose the strongest answers (either in support (7) or nonsupport (1)).   
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Fig. 1.: Support for the peace process by count 
Additional descriptive statistics may be useful to understand just how strong or weak conflict 
exposure, civic engagement, and civil society engagement was among the survey respondents. 
Below are the frequencies of three variables: Conflict Exposure, Civic Engagement, and Civil 
Society Engagement: 
 
Fig. 2: Conflict exposure by count  
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Fig. 3: Civic engagement by count 
 
Fig. 4: Civil society engagement by count 
These frequency charts give a clearer picture about trends among respondents. Figure 2 reveals 
that the majority of respondents had little to no conflict exposure based on the five questions 
used to compose the additive scale. Overwhelmingly, respondents answered no to all 5 questions, 
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and the frequency graph skews heavily right. Figure 3 shows no clear pattern, showing that a 
majority of respondents scored 2 on the 4-point scale measuring civic engagement, with the 
second largest category being 0 (no civic engagement), while Figure 4 shows a right skew, with 
the majority of respondents within the 0-6 range when measured on civil society engagement. 
Although the scale measured to 21, no respondents scored that maximum.  
 
Analysis: Issue I 
The linear regression model produced when measuring the impact of conflict exposure on civic 
engagement was:  
[Civic Engagement] = β0 + β1*[Conflict Exposure] + β2*[gender] + β3*[age] + β4*[skin tone] 
+ β5*[income] + β5*[urban/rural]  
The results of the regression analysis can be seen below:  
Variables Coefficient estimate Standard Error 
(Constant) 0.648*** 0.178 
Conflict Exposure 0.129*** 0.022 
Gender -0.024 0.054 
Age 0.013*** 0.002 
Skin tone -0.015 0.015 
Income 0.003 0.006 
Urban/Rural 0.130* 0.068 
*: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***p<0.01   
Table 2: Regression Results Measuring Conflict Exposure on Civic Engagement 
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The linear regression model produced when measuring the impact of conflict exposure on civil 
society engagement was:  
[Civil Society Engagement] = β0 + β1*[Conflict Exposure] + β2*[gender] + β3*[age] + 
β4*[skin tone] + β5*[income] + β5*[urban/rural]  
The results of the regression analysis can be seen below:  
Variables Coefficient estimate Standard Error 
(Constant) 2.930*** 0.697 
Conflict Exposure 0.414*** 0.102 
Gender* ___ ___ 
Age 0.012 0.009 
Skin tone 0.057 0.068 
Income -0.074*** 0.028 
Urban/Rural 0.664** 0.317 
*: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***p<0.01   
Table 3: Regression Results Measuring Conflict Exposure on Civil Society Engagement 
So, what do these results mean?  
Both Tables 2 & 3 show the regression results when measuring the impact of conflict 
exposure on one’s civic engagement and one’s civil society engagement respectively. In other 
words, the regression measures how great (or little) a dependent variable has on the independent 
variable. According the results of the first regression, shown in Table 2, the additive variable 
“Conflict Exposure,” measured by the six-point scale is statistically significant at the highest 
level (p< 0.01). Of the control variables, age was also statistically significant at the 0.01 level, 
while urban/rural location was statistically significant at the 0.1 level. This specific regression 
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equation reveals that the variable Conflict Exposure does positively impact one’s Civic 
Engagement (the positive correlation can be seen via the positive coefficient estimate, meaning 
that an increase in Conflict Exposure will positively increase one’s Civic Engagement level). 
This supports the first hypothesis, which states that “exposure to conflict is positively associated 
with engagement in civil society organizations.” 
Table 3 shows the impact of Conflict Exposure on Civil Society Engagement. In this 
regression, the variables Conflict Exposure and Income were statistically significant at the lowest 
level (p<0.01), while urban/rural location was statistically significant at the p<0.05 level. There 
was an issue with the data in analyzing the impact of gender, and the SPSS software used in this 
analysis rejected the variable in this analysis. However, conflict exposure was positive and 
statistically significant, meaning that the second hypothesis was also supported: “exposure to 
conflict is positively associated with personal civic engagement.” 
 
Analysis: Issue II 
The linear regression model produced when measuring the impact of civic engagement on 
support for the peace process was:  
[Support for Peace] = β0 + β1*[Civic Engagement] + β2*[gender] + β3*[age] + β4*[skin tone] 
+ β5*[income] + β5*[urban/rural]  
The results of the regression analysis can be seen below:  
Variables Coefficient estimate Standard Error 
(Constant) 2.664*** 0.400 
Civic Engagement 0.298*** 0.061 
Gender -0.211* 0.121 
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Age 0.012*** 0.004 
Skin tone 0.076** 0.033 
Income -0.006 0.014 
Urban/Rural 0.328** 0.152 
*: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***p<0.01   
Table 4: Regression Results Measuring Civic Engagement on Support for Peace 
This regression shows that civic engagement and age were statistically significant variables on 
support for the peace process at the most significant level (p<0.01), while skin tone and 
urban/rural were significant at the second level (p<0.05) and gender was significant at the 
highest level. These results show a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
civic engagement and support for the peace process, thus supporting the third hypothesis: “civic 
engagement is positively associated with attitudes towards the peace process.” 
 
Analysis: Issue III  
The linear regression model produced when measuring the impact of civil society engagement on 
support for the peace process was:  
[Support for Peace] = β0 + β1*[Civil Society Engagement] + β2*[gender] + β3*[age] + 
β4*[skin tone] + β5*[income] + β5*[urban/rural]  
The results of the regression analysis can be seen below:  
Variables Coefficient estimate Standard Error 
(Constant) 1.097** 0.481 
Civil Society Engagement 0.193*** 0.027 
Gender*   
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Age 0.014** 0.006 
Skin tone 0.116** 0.047 
Income 0.036* 0.020 
Urban/Rural 0.504** 0.218 
*: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***p<0.01   
Table 5: Regression Results Measuring Civil Society Engagement on Support for Peace 
 
Additionally, included is a regression analysis of each individual variable which was 
incorporated into the additive “Civil Society Engagement.”  
Variables Coefficient estimate Standard Error 
(Constant) 1.163** 0.499 
Attending religious org.  0.157** 0.068 
Attending parent org. 0.148 0.092 
Attending community involvement org. 0.240* 0.137 
Attending political org. 0.190 0.193 
Attending women’s org. 0.210* 0.111 
Attending community action org. 0.144 0.134 
Attending peace org. 0.340** 0.157 
Gender* ___ ___ 
Age 0.014** 0.006 
Skin tone 0.119** 0.047 
Income 0.035** 0.020 
Urban/Rural 0.509** 0.221 
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*: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***p<0.01   
Table 6: Separated Regression Results Measuring Various Civil Society Engagement on Support 
for Peace 
In this final regression, no variable was found to be statistically significant at the 0.01 level, 
however attending a religious organization, attending a peace organization, age, skin tone, 
income, and urban/rural were all found to be statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Attending a 
community involvement organization and attending a women’s organization were both found to 
be statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Table 5 was used to show the combined effect of civil 
society organization involvement, while Table 6 broke down that additive category to show the 
individual effect of each organization, giving a better picture of the true effect, since clearly the 
impact of each type of organization differs. Based upon the results in Table 5, with the more 
broad “civil society engagement” variable being statistically significant at the 0.01 level, the 
fourth and final hypothesis is also supported: “civil society involvement is positively associated 
with attitudes towards the peace process.” 
 
   
 
   
 
Conclusion 
All four hypotheses were supported, after creating additive variables to combine multiple survey 
questions on the 2016 Colombian LAPOP data set. Based upon the analysis section, greater 
conflict exposure positively impacts one’s engagement in civic society and in civil society 
organizations, and both those engagements in turn positively impact one’s support for the 2016 
Colombian peace accord.  
 This analysis is but a brief beginning on variables which have been, and can be, studied 
far more in-depth specific to the Colombian peace accord. As stated earlier, understanding which 
social groups have positive (or negative) impact on a group’s opinion of peace processes can be 
useful in implementing future peace strategies, such as helping a peace maker further explore the 
concerns or hesitancies of that group.  
 The data set studied had plenty of useful variables to consider, however if running these 
analyses again, I would look to find other data sets about civic engagement and civil society 
engagement to complement this set. The topics are undoubtedly broad and would be more 
beneficial to narrow down types of organizations or other forms of civic engagement, to better 
understand the actual impact on support for the peace process.   
 It would additionally be worth studying the change in these variables after the next set of 
LAPOP data comes out, or more generally, the impact of civil society engagement. In Colombia, 
assassinations of social movement leaders have been increasing at unexpected rates (in 2016, 
lethal violence took the lived of approximately 166 social movement leaders, in 2017 the 
violence took the lives of 185 leaders, and by 2018 an estimated 284 social movement leaders 
were killed (Rozo and Ball 2019). This targeting of social leaders has not gone unnoticed and is a 
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source of protests and public discontent. It is possible that this phenomenon has not affected the 
variables in this study at all, although it is worth discussion.  
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